|
Interview with LTC Paul Yingling
|
|
|
|
 |
| Collection | Operational Leadership Experiences |
| Title | Interview with LTC Paul Yingling |
| Abstract | After serving as executive officer of 2nd Battalion, 18th Field Artillery Regiment in Operation Iraqi Freedom I where his unit reduced captured enemy ammunition and trained the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling returned to Iraq in March 2005 to begin a one-year deployment (the subject of this interview) as the effects coordinator for the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. "The job of effects coordinator is not a particularly well defined position in doctrine, " Yingling admitted. "What I ended up being responsible for was information operations, public affairs, psychological operations, civil affairs and Iraqi security forces development to a certain extent. I also did some filler utility work in engineering, in ISF facilities development, and was the regimental XO when we had to do some split operations and the XO was committed elsewhere." Initially in south Baghdad and then sent to western Nineveh Province - at that point a major training base and sanctuary for the insurgency in Mosul and Baghdad - Yingling and 3rd ACR principally conducted Operation Restoring Rights in the summer and fall of 2004, a "combined area security operation, the purpose of which was to establish security in Tall Afar and the outlying areas so we could proceed along the other lines of operation. It consisted of the 3rd Iraqi Army Division of about 8, 000 troops, " Yingling explained, "as well as 3rd ACR, selected Special Forces, Iraqi police and also a brigade from the 2nd Iraqi Army Division. All told it was about 11, 000 troops: 8, 000 Iraqi and about 3, 000 coalition forces in what was essentially about a three-by-three square kilometer area." Yingling discusses this operation in great detail, touching on everything from the key pre-mission advice given by Iraqi civilian and military leaders to the performance of Iraqi units in combat. He talks about detainee ops, unravels the complex relationship between al-Qaeda members and former Iraqi Army soldiers in the Tall Afar area, and explains why he feels that "our forces operating in close proximity and cooperation with the Iraqis is really the best information operations we can do." The "institutional Army, " Yingling says, "has not caught up in either professional education or organizational design with the challenges of counterinsurgency … [and] if I had to condense [my advice] into a pithy little bullet it would be: don't train on finding the enemy; train on finding your friends and they will help you find your enemy." |
| Keywords | Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); Iraq War, 2003-; 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR); Operation Restoring Rights; Civil Affairs (CA); Psychological Operations (PSYOP); Information Operations (IO); Public Affairs (PA); Iraqi security forces; Insurgency; Counterinsurgency; Field Artillery; 2-18 FA; Iraqi Army; 212th FA Brigade; Baghdad; Mosul; Nineveh Province; McMaster, H.R.; Operation Veterans Forward; Tall Afar; al-Qaeda; Sunni; Shi'a; Wolf Brigade; al-Jibouri, Najim Abdullah Abid; al-Dosekey, Khorsheed Saleem; General officer; 3rd Iraqi Army Division; Operation Black Typhoon; Turkmen; Turkey; Lessons learned; Iraqi police; Bush, George W.; Ministry of Interior (MOI); Iraqi government; Dempsey, Martin; Leadership; Special Forces (SF); Detainee operations; Improvised Explosive Device (IED); Syria; Operation Rifles Blitz; Reilly, Gregory; Hickey; Chris; Teeples, David; Doctrine; Urban operations |
| Interviewee | LTC Paul Yingling |
| Interviewer | John H. McCool and Dr. Rick Herrera |
| Publisher | Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, |
| Date of Interview | 2006-09-22 |
| Resource Type | Textual |
| Format | PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 16 p.; 334 KB. |
| Original Format | WAV file; 67:58 minutes |
| Distribution Statement | Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited |
| Repository | Combined Arms Research Library |
| Disclaimer | The views and opinions expressed in these interviews are those of the interviewees themselves and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Combat Studies Institute, the US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, or the Department of the Army as a whole. |
|
|
|
|
|
