Cultural awareness is a force multiplier; failure to recognize this can have adverse impacts on operations. Since the first coalition troop deployments to Afghanistan after the events of 9/11, the U.S. Army has received much criticism over the lack...
Counterinsurgents have raised and employed irregular security forces in many campaigns over the last century. Irregular security forces are indigenous forces, not part of the regular police or military organizations of the host nation, that are...
Insurgency and counterinsurgencies differ from conventional warfare in that military strength alone cannot bring success. Insurgencies are "people's wars" as the insurgent forces are dependent on the population for manpower, intelligence,...
The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal broke out when the international situation was unfavorable for the Communists, and it grew faster than anticipated. The Government of Nepal’s (GoN's) effort was not well planned; however, many of the...
Since the events of September 11, 2001 the United States military counternetwork operations, theory, and doctrine have failed to account for the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks used by both interstate insurgencies, such...
South Korea needs to look ahead to problems it may face after North Korea's collapse and prepare to counter any North Korean insurgency that might result from the expansion of conflicts between political power groups. After the death of Kim...
This monograph develops an alternative approach to counterinsurgency, and explains how the current narratives in the field of counterinsurgency are not completely accurate. Counterinsurgents only need to properly understand the environment and then...
Given ongoing conflicts and the likelihood of executing counterinsurgency in the future, it is vital to conduct effective campaign planning for counterinsurgency. Additionally, effective campaign planning is essential for rapid and effective...
Does third party military intervention help or hurt an incumbent government during an insurgency? This study attempts to answer this question by testing prevailing military theories of counterinsurgency in the context of third party intervention...
Counterinsurgents have raised and employed irregular security forces in many campaigns over the last century. Irregular security forces are indigenous forces, not part of the regular police or military organizations of the host nation, that are...
The British and US experience with the use of local, irregular security forces suggest their importance in assisting the host nation government and counterinsurgent forces. Their successful establishment, training, and employment demonstrate the...
This monograph tells the narrative of the FARC in Colombia from the perspective of the counterinsurgent and presents a summary of the evolution of the FARC. The Colombian government has achieved recent success against the FARC after more than forty...
Historically, the United States Army has had difficulty articulating and justifying force requirements to civilian decision makers. Most recently, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reinvigorated the debate over estimated force requirements. Because...
What is the military’s most effective model for restoring essential services during counterinsurgency operations? That question drove this monograph to compare the most popular restoration model, the SWEAT Model, against a new model, the...
This monograph questions the utility of military deception (MILDEC) given its decidedly different dynamics inside counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. It examines relevant theoretical touchstones and doctrinal frameworks to determine whether the...
While Afghan women are difficult for coalition forces to access in their counterinsurgency efforts, they play a central role in their families and are the primary care-givers for, and have significant influence over, their children. U.S. Army...
Current Army doctrine lacks a security metrics paradigm similar to the infrastructure paradigm SWEAT-MSO. Because of this, commanders, staff, subordinates, other government leaders, and the media lack a simple and common set of terms to use when...
While the outcome of the Iraq war seems to have validated the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, the war in Afghanistan seems to indicate there are fundamental problems associated with its historical principles and concepts. Dr....
This thesis explores the applicability of current US counterinsurgency doctrine in Joint Publication 3-24, Field Manual 3-24 and Field Manual 3-24.2 to the Lebanese Hizballah and Taliban insurgencies. In particular, this thesis examines the Cold...
This thesis contends the debate on whether to embrace a population-centric or enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan detracts focus from building a balanced approach, customized for the human and political landscape in each area of...