This study examines the extensive experiences of the Soviet Army as it struggled to master the night. Driven by necessity to operate in the relative safety of darkness, the Soviet Army in World War II learned to capitalize on night operations and...
The U.S. Army believes that deception is a vital part of military operations. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, acknowledges that the Soviet Army mastered operational deception in World War II. While its success is widely recognized, there are few...
The focus of this study is on how the armies of different nations countered the threat of massive concentrated artillery and/or other types of preparatory fires. Not all were successful, and the reasons for the success or failure of each army...
Combat Studies Institute developed this bibliography in response to a growing interest by the Army in the operational level of war. Defined in FM 100-5, Operations (1982), as the planning, conducting, and sustaining of larger units to obtain...
This monograph discusses offensive indirect fire tactics and their relationship to extreme fear responses. It examines the nature and causes of a specific, immediate, and debilitating fear response called the Combat Stress Reaction (CSR)....
The concept of "operational fires" has been proposed within the Army as one of several operating systems at the operational level of war in the same sense that Battlefield Operating Systems have proven their utility at the tactical level. However,...
This study is a historical analysis of the demonstrated Russian and American artillery principles and techniques which were instrumental in achieving success in offensive actions at the operational level of war during World War II. Each army's...