An examination of Joint Pub (JP) 5-00.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign Planning, reveals two major disconnects. The publication asserts that the essence of operational art lies in protecting and maintaining the integrity of...
This monograph introduces a model of defeat mechanisms that could help establish a common, useful framework for planning. Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege’s experience and study have shown him that three basic defeat mechanisms...
This monograph addresses the question: What are the essential elements of operational design and commander's guidance that a campaign planner needs to produce an integrated operational concept for a joint campaign plan? While joint doctrine...
This thesis investigates ways to contend with Carl von Clausewitz's center of gravity concept. It describes the concept's importance and the alarming degree of confusion regarding its application. The thesis describes the use of knowledge...
This monograph examines Soviet operational centers of gravity during Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Specifically, the examination focuses in two areas: (1) German planning for Operation Barbarossa; (2) the...
Current U.S. military doctrine identifies the “center of gravity” (COG) as one of the key elements in theater and operational design planning. Since Karl von Clausewitz formalized the COG concept in On War, military planners have used it as a...
Theory and doctrine Warfighting's moral domain. Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II, US Army, and Major Jacob D. Biever, US Army Blending maneuver and attrition. Colonel Lamar Tooke, US Army, Retired Revamping...
This thesis identifies the operational and strategic centers of gravity of United Nations Operations, Somalia II (UNOSOM II). The research demonstrates that UNOSOM II failed to correctly identify its own strategic center of gravity. This failure...
In 1986, the US Army introduced Carl von Clausewitz's concept of center of gravity in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, and defined it as the ""hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends."" The manual explicitly stated that the...
This monograph highlights the lack of a doctrinal course of action development process for creating campaign plans. Such a process is needed due to the inexperience of both senior leaden and middle-grade staff officers with the operational level of...
United States military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that adversaries are likely to persist in seeking advantage through asymmetric warfare. Within this context, emerging doctrine on Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Effects Based...
Most important of the changes affecting today's Army, probably, is the manner in which the Army conceptualizes the performance of its primary missions-protecting and defending the Constitution and fighting the nation's wars. Current institutional...
This monograph discusses the role of intelligence in support of operational art. Intelligence support at all levels of war is critical for the commander to successfully apply force to achieve the established goals and objectives. This is...
Technology and Decision making Using Tactical Decision Exercises to Study Tactics. Major Frank W. Brewster II, U.S. Army Clausewitz Meets Learning Agent Technology. Colonel Antonio M. Lopez, Jr., U.S. Army, Retired; Colonel Jerome J. Comello,...
This thesis is an analysis and evaluation of the British and American campaign strategies in the Southern Campaign of the War for American Independence. After over four and one-half years of inconclusive fighting in America, the British government...
This monograph discusses the dilemma that current logistical thinking and doctrine face as they enter the 21st Century. Current logistical thinking is grounded in the structures, organizations, strategy, and equipment of the Cold War. As the Army...