The CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) contains many aspects that are strategically vital to the United States, but before the abhorrent attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States military had not permanently assigned a significant...
This study examines the coordination of the Joint Phase 0 shaping activities that take place as part of Central Command theater engagement. The focus is on horizontal synchronization across staff elements and vertical synchronization through...
This study analyzes the decisions of Lieutenant General Frederick Franks during the planning and execution of the ground campaign of Desert Storm. Franks has been criticized for being consumed with the synchronization of his multi-division attack...
By examining four historical contexts featuring corps headquarters performing their doctrinal roles, this study indentified three signposts that assist practitioners with anticipating the future role of a corps headquarters at onset and throughout...
The historical examples of World War I, World War II, Korea, and the 1991 Gulf War are the basis of the current Joint and Army campaign planning doctrine. These conflicts highlight the requirement to centrally plan campaigns that efficiently...
The 1991 Coalition victory in Desert Storm exemplified the awesome capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces weapons and doctrine. The Army's Air Land Battle doctrine was finally used in combat and proven effective. The short campaign ended with the...
The Department of Defense requested an increase of 74,200 soldiers to the Army in January 2007 to meet strategic demands, mitigate capability issues and relieve the pressure of constant deployments on soldiers and families. The increase was...
Effective operational transitions are crucial for success, but recent interventions indicate that U.S. forces, and the Army in particular, struggle with planning and executing the transition to post-combat operations. By developing and applying a...
The purpose of this monograph is to offer some practical solutions to building unity of effort between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and conventional forces using operations in Afghanistan from 2001 until 2009 as a case study. In researching U.S....
This monograph proposes that one of the Army's primary doctrinal concepts, combat power, requires modification to keep pace with the changing environment of conflict. It argues that the Army's combat power model, defined as the combined effects of...
This monograph addresses the question, "Is the 1999 edition of FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, adequate to integrate the actions of special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces on the contemporary battlefield?" ...
This monograph addresses the question: Do the planning staffs at the Unified Combatant Commands have the personnel resources and training to conduct crisis action planning for contingencies without augmentation from other organizations? The Unified...
This monograph considers whether existing US Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C41) systems enhanced the effectiveness of US operational commanders' decision-making processes in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) in...
The Gulf War provided a glimpse of the possibility for the simultaneous tactical, operational and strategic paralysis of the enemy. Technology coupled with sheer numbers gave the joint force commander the ability to pursue multiple objectives...
In February 1991, the Allied Coalition forces led by the U.S. achieved a stunning victory over the Iraqi forces in the Persian Gulf War. Did the U.S. Military validate the Army's new Airland Battle doctrine with its emphasis on maneuver warfare...
The fast tempo decisive combat operations has been called the "New American Way of War." This is in contrast to the traditional "American Way of War" which emphasized using massive amounts of firepower in a "grinding strategy of attritions" like...
This study, utilizing the National Training Center (NTC) as a case study, analyzes how the US Army, as part of its Title 10 requirement, provides organized, trained, and equipped forces to meet the needs of combatant commanders. The purpose is to...
This unclassified study evaluates the intelligence support the Army received from national intelligence agencies during JUST CAUSE and the Gulf War by using the seven characteristics of intelligence quality found in Joint Pub 2-0. The new national...
This monograph examines the operational deception plan used in Operation Desert Storm from 17 January to 28 February 1991 in relation to U.S. Army deception doctrine. Using the deception plan from Operation Overlord in World War II to illustrate...
This is a study of the medical logistics system that supported the U.S. forces in the maneuver phase of the Iraq War, 20 March to 1 May 2003. It begins with a review of logistical lessons learned from retired logisticians stretching from World War...